Limited consumer attention limits product market competition: prices are stochastically lower the more attention is paid. Ads compete to be the lowest price in a sector but compete for attention with ads from other sectors: equilibrium ad shares follow a CES form. When a sector gets more proÞtable, its advertising expands: others lose ad market share. The "information hump" shows highest ad levels for intermediate attention levels. The Information Age takes off when the number of viable sectors grows, but total ad volume reaches an upper limit. Overall, advertising is excessive, though the allocation across sectors is optimal.
Introduction
According to a Wiki cite, perhaps the Þrst academic to articulate the concept of attention economics was Herbert Simon when he wrote ...in an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it. (Simon 1971, p. 40-41) . This is echoed in Lanham (2006) , in the idea that we are drowning in information, but short of the attention to make sense of that information. 1 Our interest in this paper is in turning around Simon's point and looking how restricted attention affects the market information provided. In particular, we look at competition between Þrms providing information in the form of ads for their products. Facing limited attention, a Þrm might try and get away with a high price in the hope that its competitors' ads about their lower prices has been crowded out from the information receiver's attention span. This leads us to consider price dispersion in the face of endogenous congestion where information from each sector competes within the sector and with each other sector (even though sectors do not directly compete except for attention). We track several overall dimensions of the economics of information overload, advertising volume and clutter, and price dispersion (some results are in the Abstract).
The Information Age has seen the means of reaching people increase enormously, with a corresponding drop in the costs of doing so. In response, the amount of advertising has gone up drastically. Shenk (1997) states that the average American encountered 560 daily advertising messages in 1971, and over 3,000 per day by 1997. 2 At the same time though, consumer retention rates for ads remains low, perhaps attention, not much information is sent because there is a good chance the consumer will get a better offer from the same sector. Prices will be low, so the beneÞt from sending a message is low. The middle ground -the "information hump" -is the fertile ground for messages, yielding a fair shot at making a sale at a reasonably high price, both by being seen but no rival from the same sector being found.
We also track the distribution of messages across sectors. With low levels of attention, highly proÞtable sectors will be most prominently represented. Increasing consumer attention brings Þrms into more competition with each other, which drives down sector proÞtability and serves to equalize opportunities across sectors while generally lowering mark-ups. Improved communication costs in speciÞc sectors lower prices there, though the extra crowding can relax competition (and raise prices) in other sectors.
The framework we use to model Þrms' actions is adapted from Butters' (1977) seminal work on informative advertising, which is remarkable for delivering a tractable and intuitive description of equilibrium price dispersion. Butters derives a density of advertised prices and sales prices; he proposes a monopolistic competition framework distinct from that of Chamberlin (1933) . In both the Butters and Chamberlinian formulations of monopolistic competition, the competitive part comes from a free-entry zero proÞt condition that closes the model. The monopolist part in Chamberlin's work comes from heterogeneity of the products sold by Þrms; in Butters it comes from the market power that Þrms have due to imperfect information that consumers do not know all Þrms' prices.
We meld Butters' approach with the advertising clutter approach formalized in Van Zandt (2005) and some of the messages sent. This reßects advertising clutter because an individual is bombarded by too many messages (in "junk" mail, billboards, television, and internet pop-ups) to pay full attention to all.
Several authors model both the consumer's choice of how much attention to supply and the actions of
Þrms vying for that attention by sending messages advertising their wares. In Falkinger (2008) , consumers can choose how tight to make message Þlters but have a limited attention capacity. In Anderson and de Palma (2009), consumers have congested attention spans because they choose how many messages to examine. In Johnson (2010) , consumers choose whether to examine all messages or to block them all.
A common feature of these models is that the consumer's attention is a common property resource insofar as a message sender ignores the effects of its own message on other senders. This means there is a congestion externality, and a tax on messages can improve the allocation of resources. 5 One concern with this conclusion is that direct business-stealing effects are closed down: message senders do not compete directly in the marketplace, they just compete for attention. A tax might a priori reduce price competition by reducing message volume, and so harm consumer welfare. We investigate this question by speciÞcally modeling competition within each of several sectors vying for consumer attention. The focus on Þrm competition necessitates simplifying the consumer side of the model: it is assumed here the consumer's attention span is Þxed outside the model.
We Þrst characterize an equilibrium model with interaction both within and across sectors. Competition within a sector means that a lower price is more likely to be the lowest sector offer in the set of messages the consumer has screened. Nonetheless, higher-price senders can remain in equilibrium: there is a trade-off between sales probability and mark-up, so all can earn zero proÞts despite price dispersion. Competition among sectors (industries) comes from overall competition for consumer attention, and price dispersion in each sector depends on all other active sectors. Surprisingly, the model endogenously generates an inverse IIA property for sector message fractions, and a CES form for the total number of messages sent. This bears an intriguing parallel to the CES utility functional form so often used to parameterize Chamberlinian models. Information congestion gives a new rationale for the CES speciÞcation, but it is now coupled with price dispersion within multiple sectors.
The model also generates a different welfare prescription from Butters (1977) . While Butters' model has the optimal and equilibrium level of information equal, we Þnd that the market allocation can be improved by taxing messages. 6 This reßects the property that advertising is excessive, in contrast to most of the theoretical economics literature on the subject (see Bagwell, 2007 , for a survey). Indeed, the standard result in the economics of informative advertising is that there is not enough advertising because Þrms do not capture the consumer surplus. This is the monopoly result (see Shapiro, 1981 , for example). Under oligopoly, this is somewhat offset by business stealing: overadvertising arises in the Grossman and Shapiro (1983) model of informative advertising when the business stealing effect outweighs the consumer surplus one. 7 Along similar lines, Stegeman (1991) shows that the market advertising is insufficient when the Butters model is amended to allow demand to have some elasticity: Þrms then tend to overprice without sufficient regard to the consumer surplus lost. In our context, over-advertising is quite natural as it dissipates rents.
The next Section describes the model and solution technique. Section 3 derives the CES form for total advertising and characterizes message volume by sector. Section 4 Þnds the advertising and sales price distributions by sector, and ties them into the earlier comparative static results. Section 5 sets out the normative properties, the neutrality result that no real changes ensue from transmission cost changes, the optimal allocation property, and the tax prescription to deal with over-advertising. Section 6 allows for distractions, which break the neutrality result, but retain the basic CES form. Section 7 concludes. The
Appendix gives a quick reminder of the Butters (1977) model.
Message reception and transmission

Assumptions
There are = Θ potential commercial sectors, indexed by θ = 1, ..., = Θ. Each active sector θ comprises a continuum of Þrms of mass n θ . 8 Each active Þrm sends just one message per consumer at a cost γ θ (which can represent the cost of a letter, or the cost of a billboard divided by the number of consumers reached). 9 A message is an (ex-ante anonymous) advertisement containing the price at which a consumer can buy the product from the sending Þrm. Firms within each sector produce homogenous goods, and each sector therefore transmits n θ messages, for a total number of N =
n θ messages (per consumer). The cost of producing the good advertised in the message is c θ (which is only incurred if the good is bought -think of a pizza for example):
if the good must be produced beforehand regardless of whether the consumer buys, it suffices to set c θ = 0 and fold the production cost into the transmission cost, γ θ .
Consumers are assumed to be identical. Messages could be sent to them by bulk mail, by email, or they could be posted on billboards, or on TV programs. However, reaching a consumer does not mean the message is registered. Each consumer has the same probability of registering a message (which means retaining the price offer). Since we assume constant returns to scale in production (constant marginal costs), we can treat the consumer as the unit of analysis and so we henceforth refer to a single consumer. 10 The consumer registers a Þxed number of messages, φ ≥ 1, which are drawn at random from the N messages sent. This reßects limited information processing capability. In what follows we will assume that not all messages sent are registered (φ < N) in order to capture advertising clutter / information congestion: this condition will hold in equilibrium under a mild assumption that ensures there are always some inactive potential sectors. After registering the φ messages, the consumer makes her purchase decisions. She chooses the lowest priced offer received from each sector (we argue below that the probability of ties is zero) and buys q θ units if that price is no larger than her reservation price for the sector, b θ .
The model can also be interpreted as competition with traditional physical stores as follows. A consumer can buy a product in a store, or else she can receive an ad enabling her to buy it cheaper. For advertisers, her reservation price, b θ , is the full price paid at the store. This full price will include her transportation costs, etc. The consumer may receive unsolicited ads from other sellers; to be entertained they must be priced below her reservation price. Assume that traditional stores are competitive so that the store price is 9 Indeed, in equilibrium no sender would want to send a second message: to do so would give a negative proÞt given the original message just made a zero proÞt under the free-entry assumption below. 10 Allowing for multiple consumer types would be useful for extending the model to analyze consumer targeting.
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Clearly, both types of goods can coexist -some products are available both in stores and through advertised offers; others are not available in stores. The model allows for this by judicious interpretation of the reservation price. In both cases, if an advertised offer is accepted at price p, the consumer surplus ascribed to the advertising sector is b θ − p.
Finally, we assume that the number of Þrms in each sector (and the density of messages in a sector at any advertised price) is determined by a zero-proÞt (free-entry) condition.
Solution technique
A Þrm's expected demand (at any price it may charge) is the probability that its message is registered and it is the lowest price received from its sector. Its expected demand also must satisfy the zero proÞt condition for the price charged. We equate the probability of making a sale at a particular price from these two different angles to Þnd the relation between the price and the advertised price distribution.
11
The highest price set by any Þrm, b θ , plays a key role because the only way the sender can avoid a loss at such a price is if it is the only message drawn from that sector. This ties down the number of messages n θ sent from sector θ as a fraction of the total number of messages sent, N . Summing over sectors yields the total number sent, N , from which we can back out the number in each sector (the n θ 's). Armed with that statistic, we can recover the equilibrium price distribution in each sector and its support. This technique also enables us to determine endogenously the equilibrium number of active sectors.
More formally, an equilibrium to the model maps the primitives
set of non-negative sector message numbers
which sum to the total message volume N . A sector is active if and only if n θ > 0. For each active sector, the equilibrium speciÞes sector purchase probabilities, 11 An alternative interpretation is to assume a Þnite number of Þrms per sector (see Baye and Morgan, 2001 , for a related analysis with a single sector and a gatekeeper). At a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium conditional on the number of Þrms entering, all prices played must yield the same proÞt level. Appending a prior entry game implies that the equilibrium proÞt level is zero. We have preferred to follow the Butters description with a continuum of Þrms, not least because the choice probabilities we use are exact (see (1) and the discussion below). P θ , for the consumer, a price distribution within each sector, and corresponding choice probabilities for each product P (p, θ). We show that equilibrium is unique, with an endogenous cut-off between active and inactive sectors. We proceed in Lemma 2 by determining message volume by sector as a function of the total message volume, N (to be determined later). We then sum over active sectors in Proposition 5, to Þnd the N consistent with a given number of active sectors. Then, in Proposition 6 we identify the active sectors.
Intermediate results describe properties of the solutions.
Message selection probability
We Þrst seek the probability that a particular message is the only one registered from a sector. Assume that n θ < N, so at least two sectors are active. 12 Given there is a total mass of N messages, and a Þnite number of draws, the probability of drawing any given message on a given draw is 1 N . It is independent of which draw we consider, since the mass of messages left does not noticeably fall with the number of messages already drawn, so the probability of drawing the message is φ N . By the same token, the mass of Þrms in sector θ is n θ < N, so that the probability of drawing a message from a competitor in the same sector is
Hence the probability of avoiding all competitors in the same sector is the probability that no message from the sector is drawn on the other φ − 1 draws, namely
is the probability that one (speciÞc) message from sector θ is registered, 13 and no other message is registered from that sector.
14 12 As will be seen later, this will be true under mild conditions. 13 We will later use the notation P (p, θ) to denote the probability of a sale at price p in sector θ: hence P θ = P (b θ , θ), since we shall show that a sale at the top price sent, b θ , only happens when the message is the only one drawn from the sector.
14 This formula can also be derived as an approximation for a Þnite number of Þrms. Suppose that search is with replacement. Then the probability of getting the message on the Þrst draw, and missing the rest of the sector on all subsequent draws is
. The probability of missing the whole sector on the Þrst k − 1 draws, drawing the message on the k th draw and missing the rest of the sector subsequently is
. Thus the chance of getting the message alone is the sum of these events, namely
. This sum simpliÞes to
Þrst-order Taylor approximation to the Þrst term,
, and so, to the Þrst-order,
, which is the expression given in the text. 
Price distribution
Recall that each Þrm chooses a single price, and there is a continuum of Þrms in each sector. There can be no equilibrium with all Þrms choosing the same price (and hence sharing the market): a common price above c θ + γ θ /q θ could be proÞtably undercut; any price c θ + γ θ /q θ or below would give negative proÞts.
We Þrst argue that the support of the equilibrium advertised price distribution (for any Þrm in active sector θ) is a compact interval £ p θ , b θ ¤ with no atoms nor gaps, where the lower bound, p θ , is to be determined below. There are no atoms in the price distribution because if there were, any sender choosing the same price as a mass of other senders would raise proÞts by inÞnitesimally cutting its price. This would leave its mark-up essentially unchanged but raise sales discretely because it then beats all others at the purported mass point whenever two lowest price messages were the same. The interval has no gaps on the support because if there were, the lower price at a gap can be raised leaving the sales probability unchanged but increasing the mark-up. This same argument implies the support must go up to b θ : if it stopped short, the highest price Þrm could raise its price with no penalty on sales probability and increase its mark-up.
Finally, the lower bound of the support must exceed c θ + γ θ /q θ because at any lower price the transmission cost cannot be recouped. It must strictly exceed this bound because there is a positive probability that the message is not read (contrast Butters).
Lemma 1 Prices in industry
there are no atoms.
Let F (p, θ) denote the fraction of messages in sector θ sent at price p or below. (Then F ¡ p θ , θ ¢ = 0 and
. A message at price p is successful as long as the price is the lowest one received: using the same logic as used to derive (1), the sales probability is
where we simply note that n θ F (p, θ) is the number of messages sent from the sector with a price below p.
We proceed in Section 3 by determining aggregate numbers of messages per sector and total messages, and in Section 4 we derive the price distribution for each sector.
9
3 Advertising levels
Advertising shares by sector
We have just argued that some Þrms will send out an ad at a price equal to the reservation price b θ , and the probability of Þnding a second ad at the same price is zero. So consider an advertisement which is sent out with price b θ . Since P θ (as given by (1)) is the probability this is the only ad found from sector θ, the equilibrium zero proÞt condition (which will tie down n θ ) reads:
where we recall that q θ is the quantity of good θ demanded. DeÞne π θ by:
which measures the economic performance (social surplus per $ transmission cost) of sector θ. It is necessary (but not sufficient) for an active sector that π θ > 1 because (b θ − c θ ) q θ must exceed γ θ in order for the sender to incur the cost of a message, given that messages are not read with certainty. Indeed, if
then even a single message sent from sector θ at the highest price would not be expected to cover its costs:
i.e.,
where φ N is the probability the message is registered. 15 The zero proÞt condition (3) for the equilibrium probability the highest-priced sender in active sector θ makes a sale is then
This probability depends only on the intrinsic economic performance index, π θ , of the sector.
LetΘ ∈ (1, = Θ] be the number of sectors for which π θ > 1: this is the maximum number of active sectors. 16 We rank these sectors such that π θ is decreasing in the index θ, i.e. from highest to lowest economic performance. For simplicity (except when we do the symmetric analysis) we will assume that all the π θ 's are different across sectors. In the sequel, we will Þnd the endogenous number of active sectors.
17
Lemma 2 Let N > φ. All sectors θ such that π θ > N φ are active sectors, and the rest are inactive. The relative sector sizes are
Proof. Equating the probability derived from the zero-proÞt condition, (5), with the probability that she gets no other message from the sector, (1), implies
, and so determines the ad market shares by rewriting this as (6) . Hence, sector θ sends a positive number of messages if and only if
We defer considering the overall comparative static properties of equilibrium because N is still to be determined in (6) . However, we can use the expression to compare across sectors of different economic characteristics within an equilibrium. Sectors with larger economic performance send more messages because they are more attractive to senders. That is, n θ > n θ 0 if and only if π θ > π θ 0 . We proceed by further characterizing the relation that sector sizes must satisfy at any equilibrium.
The inverse IIA property
Sector message sizes exhibit a type of IIA property (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) in the sense that the ratio of ad market shares of two sectors depends only on their proÞtabilities for a given N . However, contrary to the usual IIA property (Þrst pointed out by Debreu (1960) in his critique of Luce's (1959) Choice Axiom), which stipulates that the ratio of market shares does not change with the number and type of other options, this ratio does change here since N changes with the proÞtability of a third sector (see also (9) below). Thus, the standard IIA property does not hold for this model. However, a related IIA property holds, with respect to the market shares of all competing sectors. We call this the inverse IIA property, 17 As we show below, there will be at least 2 sectors under the mild condition that π 2 > 1.
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which pertains to the ratios m −θ ≡ N−n θ N . From (6), the inverse IIA property is:
whereΘ is the number of active sectors. This is a property of invariance of the ratio of all rivals' advertising levels as the appeal of any rival (outside the pair) changes. Analogously to the way the IIA property implies the Logit model (see Luce, 1959) , the inverse IIA property implies an inverse Logit formulation:
Proposition 3 At any equilibrium withΘ active sectors, the non-θ shares have a logit form:
where the LHS is the non-share of sector θ over the total non-share of all sectors.
Proof. Inverting (7),
Summing over θ 0 gives (Θ−1)
, and the result follows directly by inversion.
The value ofΘ is endogenous here (and is determined below). Only the active sectors are counted:
inactive sectors π θ are excluded from the summation. The same caveat applies below.
As π θ increases, the RHS of (8) falls: as the proÞtability of a sector rises, it produces proportionately more ads while the others produce relatively less. Even a mature sector may enjoy a higher proÞtability if γ θ falls, perhaps because of the advent of a new medium which might complement advertising its goods and get larger ad market shares which come at the expense of the others. 19 Indeed, as shown in sections 3.4 and 3.5, weak sectors might be pushed out of the market entirely. The effects of raising φ on the distribution of messages by sector are fundamentally those of the logit formulation (see for example Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992)), though the derivation of that form above differs from the usual roots. 18 Therefore
, which indicates that IIA does not hold, where Ψ θ is deÞned below in (8). 19 We see in Section 3.5 that the number of ads from sector θ 0 may actually rise if that sector is sufficiently attractive.
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Proposition 4 ForΘ > 1 constant, as φ rises, the ad market share of the most proÞtable sector decreases with φ, and the share of the least proÞtable sector increases. As φ falls to 1, almost all messages are sent by the most proÞtable sector.
Proof. To show the Þrst point, ÞxΘ > 1. The relation in (8) gives the fraction of messages in sector θ as
(where the symbol s = denotes that the derivative has the sign of the expression), or (since XΘ
Hence, the share decreases with φ for the most proÞtable sector (1), and increases for the least proÞtable one (Θ). Finally, note from (8) that
Hence, lim 20 This can be seen as follows. If N messages are sent, all from sector 1, and one is drawn, then monopoly pricing implies the proÞt from a message is
The zero proÞt condition implies the number of messages is π 1 . 21 As we shall see below, if all sector transmission costs fall proportionately, the range of prices stays the same in each sector: the density of messages sent at any price simple rises proportionately (to the cost decrease) for all sectors. 13 
At the other extreme, when the attention span is extensive, any price above the lowest in the sector will almost certainly be beaten. All sectors are very competitive, so sectors become equally (un)attractive: a lot of price competition means very few messages per sector.
WhenΘ > 2, the advertising shares of the intermediate sectors are not necessarily monotonic in the level of consumer attention, φ. To see this, consider 3 sectors. Sectors 1 and 2 have very high proÞts, with 2 slightly less than 1, while sector 3 has very low proÞt. When the attention span is slightly above one message, sector 1 is active while 2 is virtually silent. For middling values of φ, both 1 and 2 have almost half the market each. For φ large, all have around one third shares. Sector 2's share is not monotonic here.
Expression (8) in turn gives rise to a familiar functional form.
Aggregate advertising
The next step is to determine the equilibrium message volume, N . Expressions (6) and (8) give two different expressions for m −i . Equating them yields: 22 Proposition 5 The equilibrium total message size givenΘ > 1 active sectors and N > φ takes a CES form:
Thus N is increasing in each proÞtability, π θ , and homogenous of degree one in the sector proÞtabilities.
Adding another viable sector raises N .
Proof. The properties are straightforward except for the last one. Consider introducing a "barely viable"
sector s with n s = 0: by (6), the corresponding performance of such a new sector s is π s = N/φ. We now verify that introducing this barely viable sector s leaves (9) unchanged:
Thence, by continuity, introducing a strictly viable sector, with π s > N/φ, will cause N to increase even if some sectors exit. 22 N can also be derived from summing up the expressions for market shares in (6). 14 
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The CES form has well-known properties. 23 Raising the proÞtability of any sector causes the total volume of messages to rise because the extra clamor causes a larger total without a fully compensating backlash from the other sectors.
Sector viability
When sectors are asymmetric, some may be precluded by the strength of those in the market. We determine the equilibrium set of active sectors. Recall thatΘ denotes the number of sectors for which π θ > 1 (any sector with π θ ≤ 1 is not viable, and so can be eliminated from the discussion). Furthermore, deÞneΘ by
and assume thatΘ ∈ ¡ 1,Θ ¢ . As we show, this means that there will be some sectors (all those with index aboveΘ) which do not advertise, and the existence of such sectors implies that the congestion condition N > φ necessarily holds.
24
Proposition 6 Assume thatΘ ∈ ¡ 1,Θ ¢ as deÞned by (10) . Then there exists a unique equilibrium: sectors 1, ...,Θ are active, and the total volume of messages is given by (9).
Proof. From Lemma 2, a sector is active in equilibrium if π θ > NΘ φ , where NΘ denotes the number of messages forΘ active sectors as given by (9) . Next, we show there is a unique cut-off between active and inactive sectors. The condition for a sector to be active is π θ > NΘ φ . Given the ranking of sectors, the LHS decreases in the marginal sector,Θ, while we showed in Proposition 5 that the RHS increases as sectors are added. Thus there is a unique solution forΘ, and it is given by (10) , where the term in the middle is NΘ φ (see (9)). Notice that necessarily the congestion condition holds: NΘ > φ since
It remains to show that the equilibrium follows the ranking: there cannot be an equilibrium with some sector θ excluded while some sector θ 0 > θ is included. If there were, then the proÞt from sending a single message from sector θ (at its monopoly price, b θ ) is π θ φ N . However, messages sent from sector θ 0 return a 23 For example, it is maximal at symmetry (under the constraint that the sum of the inverse π θ 's is constant). 24 If all potential sectors are active, we get into a corner solution where the condition N > φ does not necessarily hold. If the model returns a solution with N < φ, it contradicts the congested formula used in setting up the choice probabilities. The existence of some latent sectors is enough to avoid that. proÞt of at most π θ 0 φ N . Hence, since π θ > π θ 0 , a message from sector θ would supplant one from sector θ 0 , so the starting point cannot be an equilibrium. 25 Viability constraints imply that equilibrium congestion across sectors may close down a sector when another sector becomes more attractive. Similarly, a newly entering or improved sector raises the congestion on the incumbents. This we illustrate next.
Raising a sector's proÞtability
Proposition 5 shows that an increase in a sector's proÞtability will increase the total number of messages sent (even if this causes exit of other sectors). Since the other sectors all send smaller shares of this larger total, the affected sector must send more messages. We now determine what happens to the other sectors.
Recall
φ−1 from (6). Hence for an unaffected sector (where π θ has not changed) it is clear that the sector share goes down. However, it is possible the number of messages it transmits goes up, as we now show (that is, we show that
can be positive). Indeed,
has the sign of (6), we have the derivative
Substituting N φ from (9) and deÞning χ θ = π
andχ as the average value of χ θ , gives
From a symmetric starting point (where χ θ =χ for all θ ≤Θ),
, which is negative if and only if φ >Θ. If though φ <Θ, a marginally higher attractivity in one sector causes message numbers to rise in all sectors. This result is broadly consistent with the rising part of the information hump (low φ) and for the early "take-off" part of the Information Age evolution depicted in Figure 1 below. There is a relatively large increase in the number of messages sent as long as the amount of competition is small.
In the asymmetric case, (11) indicates that there is a cut-off value of χ θ for which dn θ dN is negative for higher χ θ and positive for lower χ θ . Since π θ is inversely related to χ θ , this means that larger sectors are 25 If there are several sectors with the same proÞtability, then they are either all active or all inactive. 26 From which we see that higher π θ 0 increases the likelihood that the expression is positive. It may seem surprising that some sectors could increase in size despite more competition and even though sectors are linked only through the negative effects of congestion (there are no demand complementarities, for example). The favored sector increases in size. This has two contradictory effects on other sectors. First, any given message is less likely to be found. However, any rival's message is also less likely to be found.
The Þrst effect impacts all industries equally. The second favors the larger industries because each Þrm has more competition, so these industries will attract new entry.
The Information Age
The key driver of the information age is lower communication costs. The homogeneity property of the CES function for N in Proposition 5 implies that total message volume doubles if all communication costs are halved.
27 This is one obvious cause of a surfeit of information: spam email is an everyday manifestation of the problem. Any such cost improvement is offset by the rise in messages sent, so all improvements are completely dissipated. 28 As we show in the next Section, price dispersion also remains unaltered, and this leads to the neutrality result given in Proposition 14 that welfare remains unchanged.
However, even though a uniform cost reduction does not cause new sectors to enter, improved communication may help some sectors more than others, insofar as some are better suited to having their ads embedded in the new media. This leads us to now consider a larger set of viable sectors. The exercise can be thought of as cost reductions in hitherto excluded sectors (or, indeed, as new product classes, like PCs and software, coming to market). 27 No further sectors will enter, since doubling of the existing message volume will preclude them, even if their transmission costs halve. Indeed, as we just noted, a sector is viable if and only if πs > N/φ.
28 This is reminiscent of Zahavi's Law in transportation, according to which average travel times have remained constant over several decades, despite substantial increases in travel speed.
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We consider the symmetric case before returning in the next Section to the asymmetric one. For the symmetric analysis, we will assume that allΘ potential sectors are active.
29 Then, with π θ = π > 1 for all θ = 1, ...,Θ, the expression (from (9)) for the total number of messages, N , reduces to
Having more sectors,Θ, raises the total number of messages. The number N is a logistic function of the number of sectors: it is Þrst convex (forΘ < φ/2 ), and then concave, forΘ > φ/2. If we were to view the number of (new) sectors as arriving at a constant rate, then this means the amount of information would accelerate at Þrst (the take-off of the Information Age) before tapering off, reminiscent of the Bass (1969) diffusion of innovation model. Indeed, the amount of information has an asymptote ofN = φπ, which is the bound to the amount of information the system can sustain. The average number of messages per sector, n θ = N/Θ, is increasing inΘ if and only if φ >Θ, so it is 29 We then need to verify that the condition N > φ is veriÞed withΘ sectors: this is duly met in the Figures below. 30 Symmetric CES models are commonly deployed in the economics of product differentiation. Note here that the sector viability constraint, π > N/φ, is automatically satisÞed.
31 At the limit, monopoly prices, b, are set in each sector, returning π when the message is chosen. The probability of being chosen is φ/N, which therefore equals 1/π (see also (5)).
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hal-00517721, version 1 -15 Sep 2010 eventually decreasing (forΘ large enough). The initial increase is explained by the idea that more sectors mean less competition, so higher prices and more incentive to send messages. The logistic function in (12) is sketched in Figure 1 , for π = 20 and φ = 20 (the function asymptotes to N = 400, the maximal value of N/Θ is attained atΘ = 20, and the inßection point is atΘ = 10). The other comparative static property of N , with respect to φ, is described next.
The information overßow hump
The advent of new media means more consumer time is now spent with ad-carrying activities, like surÞng the internet or sending email. This likely implies an increase in the overall consumer attention span as more hours are spent on media. The thumbnail capture in the model of this increased span is to raise φ.
From the symmetric analysis (see (12) , which is slightly less than 10). The dashed line is the line φ = N . Figure   2 shows the quasi-concave function, i.e., Þrst increasing, then decreasing with the attention span, φ. This we term the information overßow hump. However, the number of messages only increases for low φ <φ (<Θ).
More attention has two conßicting consequences. First, it raises the probability a message from the sector is seen, which raises proÞtability, and hence the number of messages sent, ceteris paribus. But it also has the effect of increasing price competition (the price distribution shifts down), as it is more likely a lower price will be found in the sector. This reduces proÞtability and leads to a smaller number of Þrms (messages).
For low φ, the price competition effect is weak in that it is quite unlikely that another message received will be from the same sector as one already received: extra messages will most likely come from unrepresented sectors. With high reception rates, the price effect dominates. In a nutshell, for low φ and givenΘ, more examination leads to more messages sent as undiscovered sectors become more likely to be found. For higher φ, more examination means more hits in the same sector, which increases price competition and so decreases sector activity.
We now turn to the price distribution, whose properties underpin the economics of the results so far.
Equilibrium price dispersion
The equilibrium sales probability corresponding to a particular price p in sector θ can be determined independently of the other sectors. However, we need to bring in the other sectors to determine which prices are actually used in equilibrium. The equilibrium sales probability for a message announcing price p in sector θ, P (p, θ), is given simply from the zero-proÞt condition as
where P (p, θ) ∈ (0, 1) for all p in the interior of the support of the equilibrium price distribution. The above expression reduces to the zero-proÞt condition (5), when p = b θ , and using the notation P (b θ , θ) = P θ .
The equilibrium sales probability above is decreasing and convex in p. We next want to use it to determine 20 the equilibrium advertised price distribution. This is done by equating P (p, θ) in the zero proÞt condition (13) to the expression given in (2) for the probability of there being no lower price drawn, which gives
where n θ /N is given by (6).
Proposition 8
The equilibrium advertised price density in sector θ is decreasing and convex on
with (truncated) Pareto distribution
where N is given by (9) and p θ is given by
Proof. The equilibrium advertised price distribution is given from the relation (14) as
Recalling that
φ−1 from (6), we can write (15) . It is readily checked that F (b θ , θ) = 1.
Since F ¡ p θ , θ ¢ = 0, the lowest price in sector θ is determined by (14) as:
Then (16) follows immediately. The corresponding density, f (p, θ) is strictly positive on £ p θ , b θ ¤ , where it is decreasing and convex (as shown by differentiation of (15)).
The distribution for sector θ depends on the other sectors through N , giving a simple general equilibrium effect. For given N , we can derive the price distributions by sector independently; since consumer surpluses by sector are additively separable and consumers are not budget constrained.
The intuition for the lowest price in the support is straightforward. A message sent at this lowest price always beats all the other messages from the sector. Hence the sales probability is just the probability that
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it is read at all, which is simply φ N since it has φ shots from a pool of N messages. Equating this probability times the mark-up to the cost of sending the message gives (16) .
As in Butters (1977) , lower prices are advertised more heavily. In the Butters model (with q θ = 1), the corresponding lowest price, p, would be simply c θ +γ θ , because such a price just covers the cost of production plus sending the message. In the Butters version, the lowest price must always get a sale because there is no information congestion, and no possibility that the message remains unread. In contrast, here the lowest price in any sector does not always make a sale. Information overßow pushes up the lowest price in the support, which is needed to compensate for the likelihood that the message may not be received.
The simplest measure of price dispersion is the breadth of the support of the equilibrium prices. This is
. Ceteris paribus, dispersion is smaller the greater is
that N depends on all the parameters of the model, apart from the inactive sectors' proÞtabilities). Hence, for example, a larger γ θ decreases N and so increases dispersion in all unaffected sectors, while decreasing dispersion in the affected sector (see (9)).
Changes within the sector affect the support as well as the aggregate message volume N . A sector can become inviable if it faces tough competition from other sectors and/or it is quite unattractive itself.
Viability can be expressed as the condition that the price support does not collapse. That is p θ < b θ . From (17) ), this means that N φ < π θ ; this is the same condition from (6) for n θ > 0 in equilibrium.
Finally, suppose instead that sector θ is associated to a conditional downward-sloping demand and the consumer will buy q θ (p) units at the lowest price, p, held. Assume that demand begets a quasi-concave proÞt function with a maximizing pricep θ . The corresponding proÞt conditional on being the only message registered in the sector) is (p θ − c θ ) q θ (p θ ), and so the proÞt per dollar transmission cost isπ θ =
which therefore plays exactly the same role as does π θ above. In equilibrium, no Þrm will charge more thanp θ because proÞts can be increased by chargingp θ , and the parallel analysis to that above yields the equilibrium price distribution as
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(cf. (15)), where N is given by (9) withπ θ replacing π θ . Now p θ is given implicitly by (16)), which has a unique price solution for p θ <p θ under the assumption that proÞt is strictly quasi-concave. 32 Compared to the distribution for rectangular demand (settingp θ = b θ and treating q θ as invariant), the distribution is now stochastically lower (FOSD) because lower prices are relatively more attractive due to the demand expansion effect.
Advertised price dispersion and sector proÞtability
Greater sector proÞtability impacts the affected sector by increasing the volume of messages sent (Proposition 5). As we now see (Proposition 9), this increases price competition, and so stochastically lowers prices.
However, this market mechanism spills over into the other sectors. Elsewhere, price competition is reduced because sector messages are crowded out in relative terms. Nonetheless, the number of messages sent in other sectors can actually rise (see Proposition 7) because the reduced price competition can raise proÞts per Þrm (which then must be reduced by further entry). This means that advertised prices (and price dispersion) can be negatively correlated across sectors. If one sector becomes more desirable (in the sense of higher surplus), prices fall in that sector as competition intensiÞes. But the additional messages crowd out messages in other sectors, and this relaxes competition 32 Otherwise, the support of the price distribution will have a gap for prices such that proÞt is no lower at a lower price.
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in those other sectors. On the other hand, across-the-board changes affecting all sectors can leave prices the same. This property underlies the result in the next Section that proportionately lower message transmission cost savings are dissipated fully: equivalently, a (proportional) tax might be raised without deadweight loss.
The sales price distribution differs from the advertised price distribution because lower prices are more likely to get sales, and also because even the lowest advertised price does not always make a sale. It is derived in the on-line version of the paper. We now follow through with the analysis of the symmetric case.
Dispersion and symmetric sectors
In the symmetric case, N is given by (12) as N = φ
π, and so the cumulative distribution function for advertised prices (15) becomes
where (16)). Hence, as φ rises, the lower bound p falls, and so intra-sector competition rises in this respect. A tighter characterization is quite immediate.
Proposition 10 Assume sectors are symmetric. A higher attention span, φ, lowers prices in the sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance.
Lower prices as attention goes up underpins the earlier comparative static results of the information hump. Even though the total message volume is not monotone (see Figure 2) , the price effect is. For low φ, prices are high and few messages are sent: for high φ, prices are low and few messages are sent. In the Þrst case, because few messages are registered, Þrms may as well set high prices and chance the low probability of another message from the same sector. In the second case, price competition intensiÞes because there is a strong likelihood another message from the same sector will be read.
Along similar lines, it is readily shown that higherΘ stochastically increases prices (with more price dispersion). This is because the limited attention is more divided. We now turn to the normative analysis.
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We Þrst undertake a welfare analysis of the performance of the market equilibrium and emphasis the excess of information. In the following two sub-sections we consider cost changes and transmission taxes -even cost increases without any corresponding revenue collection can improve the allocation. These results stress the extent of the market failure, and also help indicate which sectors are particularly responsible.
One strong property of the Butters (1977) model is that the market allocation is optimal. However, this property crucially depends on his assumption that each message hits somewhere. 33 In our set-up, there is rent dissipation and socially wasteful duplication of messages. 34 Competition for attention imposes a congestion externality which leads to excessive advertising: this feature is perhaps more in tune (rather than optimality or under-advertising) with one's personal reaction to advertising clutter.
The welfare function is given by summing over sectors the total sector surplus times the probability a sale is made in the sector, and then subtracting the message costs. DeÞne
as the probability that there is at least one hit in sector θ: the probability that each of the n θ messages is missed on each of the φ draws. Notice that
Thus the increased chance of discovering a sector when an extra message is sent is the probability that the extra message is registered when no other message from the sector has registered. We can write the welfare function (for any values n θ ≥ 0, θ = 1, ...,Θ) as
where N = XΘ θ=1 n θ . This form (breaking out N as a separate argument) is convenient for what follows. 33 It also depends on the rectangular demand assumption. Stegeman (1991) shows that there is insufficient advertising if demand slopes down, because Þrms do not internalize the consumer surplus of lower prices. 34 Clearly the Þrst best optimum comprises one message per sector, and the active sectors should be the φ for which the proÞt per message, (b θ − c θ ) q θ − γ θ , is highest. If γ is the same for all θ, these are the Þrst φ ones, those for which π θ is highest. 35 When it comes later to including tax revenues, all we will need to assume is that they have some social value.
25
hal-00517721, version 1 -15 Sep 2010
Lemma 11
The social beneÞt from an extra message in sector θ is equal to
where the RHS terms are private sector proÞt and congestion externality respectively.
Proof. From (21), we have
: noting that dN dn θ = 1 (message anonymity) gives the Þrst inequality in (22) . Now, from (21) and (19), and then using (20), we have that
This expression is the proÞt of a Þrm setting the top price in active sector θ ≤Θ given n θ messages emanating from the sector (see (5)). Since this is zero in equilibrium, the remaining term, ∂W/∂N , is naturally interpreted as the congestion externality from active sectors.
The next result shows the externality is negative, and quantiÞes it at the equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 12
The total number of messages transmitted is excessive in equilibrium, and the (negative) congestion externality is measured as the average transmission cost,
Proof. Recall that
, and ∂W (n e ,N e ) ∂n θ = 0 (where the superscript e denotes that the variable is evaluated at its equilibrium value) by the zero proÞt condition of equilibrium for all active θ. Then we have that
. From (21), we have for active sectors
Using the zero proÞt condition (3) we get
i.e., the congestion externality is strictly negative and equal to (minus) the average transmission cost.
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This result underscores the main problem with the market equilibrium: although (as we show next) the allocation is (second-best) optimal across sectors given the total equilibrium message volume, the overall volume is excessive. This is seen clearly from what we just argued in Lemma 11, namely that ∂W (n e ,N e ) ∂n θ = 0 (i.e., evaluated at the equilibrium), while dW (n e ,N e ) dN < 0. However, while optimal and private incentives are aligned in terms of allocation, the private choice ignores the message crowding externality on all other sectors, which is measured by ∂W (n e ,N e ) ∂N < 0. This implies excessive messages are sent. The social cost of an extra message, as per (25), is the average sending cost. This relation holds because if extra messages have to be sent, they should be allocated across sectors in proportion to the sector representation in the population: one more message therefore costs the average transmission cost.
Proposition 13
The equilibrium allocation of messages across sectors is socially optimal given the number of messages transmitted at the equilibrium. This is proved in the Appendix. The key feature that generates the optimality result is (20) : the marginal change in the choice probability holding Þxed the total number of messages,
, which is crucial to the social problem, is equal to the probability P θ that the highest-priced Þrm makes a sale in the private problem. The equivalence holds because the probability that an extra message is examined and nothing else was examined from the sector reßects both its social contribution and the private incentive for sending it.
Increasing transmission costs uniformly
We Þrst establish a strong neutrality result for across-the-board cost changes. Uniform transmission cost decreases raise advertising levels (and industry sizes) proportionately, and so are a strong driver for increased information, but they do not affect the real outcome. Indeed, the economics of lower transmission rates are the economics of rent dissipation. Halving the cost in each sector simply doubles the number of ads sent per sector. The intuition comes from the fact that both N and n θ are homogeneous of degree minus one. The sector choice probabilities (n θ /N ) are then homogeneous of degree zero in the percentage cost increase. The advertised price distribution, F (p, θ) is then also independent of such cost changes. This also explains why no sectors enter in the face of a common cost increase: halving transmission costs also halves the chance the If tax revenues were discarded, a tax would have no effect on welfare. Any tax not lost in the collection is therefore a social gain, and gets transferred purely from costs. Since proÞts are zero, consumers are just as well off since they face the same situation (same distributions, but fewer overall messages). The tax is therefore raised without deadweight loss.
Proposition 13 showed that the base allocation of messages was optimal for the equilibrium message volume, N e . By Proposition 14, an equal percentage tax on transmission scales back messages proportionately.
However, unless transmission costs are the same across sectors, the scaled-back message levels induced by a non-negligible tax are not optimal for the new (given) total volume of messages. Indeed, the partial welfare derivative (23) is partial derivatives are still to be equalized across sectors at any constrained optimal allocation for given N e .
However, the market equilibrium condition in the presence of a proportional tax, τ , on transmission becomes
This means that the allocation is constrained optimal (all the ∂W (n e , N e ) /∂n θ are equal) either if τ = 0 (where we evaluated the earlier welfare derivative), or if all the transmission costs, γ θ , are equal. Otherwise, ramping up the transmission cost with a tax causes an allocative distortion: from (26), the higher-cost messages ought to be provided more (and the lower-cost ones less). This means that the cheaper messages tend to be overused in equilibrium (in the presence of the tax). These are the ones associated with the most dissipation, ceteris paribus.
This suggests that the low transmission-cost sectors are over-represented in the population of messages (in the sense that they ought to be scaled back more than proportionately). Although the proportional tax does not effect choice probabilities, the fact that the allocation is no longer optimal if transmission costs are different means that the optimal tax (given a target N ) is not a proportional one. Instead, the optimal tax should fall more heavily on the cheaper message communications: from (26), the sector-speciÞc tax rate that ensures all sectors have the same marginal social beneÞt entails τ θ inversely proportional to γ θ . 36 
SpeciÞc cost increases
Proposition 13 suggests that low transmission-cost sectors do not inßict more damage on high transmissioncost ones, or vice versa, at equilibrium. All sectors are in excess, but no group should be singled out.
This result leads us to ask whether a deterioration in a sector -say an increase in the sector's sending cost (like a tax with the proceeds discarded) -can reduce welfare. As we shall show, such an increase cannot help if all sectors are the same, but it can if they are sufficiently asymmetric. Loosely, cost increases may help on sectors with low transmission costs (relative to surplus) and those with low surpluses.
36 Indeed, the Þrst-best optimum entails just one message per sector, which also suggests more than proportional scaling back through taxes of low-cost sectors. Low-cost sectors are also the sectors with small tax raised per message: the high-cost sectors have the additional social beneÞt of larger tax revenue per message. Proof. From (21) , and since ∂W ∂n θ 0 = 0 at equilibrium for active sectors, the relevant welfare derivative is
This expression indicates that there is a trade-off. From (25),
n θ 0 γ θ 0 ; from (9), we have
χ , where we recall thatχ is the average value of χ θ = ³ 1 π θ´1 φ−1 . Pulling these expressions together, the derivative condition is:
Under symmetry, a rise in one sector's transmission costs has no effect at the margin, since dW/dγ θ = 0.
To deal with asymmetric sectors, it helps to rewrite the above expression as
where Γ θ = n θ γ θ is the aggregate transmission cost for sector θ, andΓ is the average of these. (27) shows that it will typically be beneÞcial to increase costs on some sectors: the two effects in
Consider two special cases. First, suppose that two sectors have the same transmission cost, and one is more proÞtable than the other, so it also has a higher equilibrium industry size (number of messages). Then Γ θ is smaller for the less proÞtable one, and χ θ is larger, so dW dγ θ is larger for the less proÞtable one. Second, suppose that two sectors are equally proÞtable, so they have the same equilibrium industry size (number of messages). If one has a higher transmission cost than the other, its Γ θ is larger, and so dW dγ θ is smaller.
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Thus, higher transmission costs are beneÞcial, ceteris paribus, in less proÞtable or in low transmission cost sectors. The tax result is an immediate corollary.
The analysis of this sub-section indicates the low-proÞt products and those with low transmission costs as being socially harmful. This holds despite them having a small foothold: one might have otherwise 37 This is because a cost increase in the sector with the larger transmission cost has a relatively smaller effect: proÞt is not changed much so there is little reduction in congestion, but the higher cost is borne over a large market base. The same cost increase in the smaller cost sector has a larger effect on proÞt, π θ , and so causes a much larger reduction in message congestion, while being borne over a smaller base since the sector contracts more. suspected high-proÞt products because they are responsible for the most crowding. The previous subsection also points the Þnger at low transmission-cost products as being over-represented when all messages are scaled back proportionately by a proportional tax. Thus these results take different perspectives on the "blame" issue, but reach similar conclusions.
Distractions
The strong neutrality property of Proposition 14, that uniform cost changes have no real effects, relies critically on the lack of outside competition for attention, which also implies the homogeneity property in (9) . One natural way to relax this property is to introduce another source of competition for attention. This amendment retains a basic CES form and the broad comparative static properties, but now implies that transmission cost changes have real effects: a lower cost increases the likelihood of Þnding any sector, and decreases prices. However, taxing messages remains optimal.
Think of consumers as having a limited amount of time, or a limited attention span. They cannot process all the information coming at them. Jostling with the price of MicroSoft Word or a supermarket ßyer for pork chops is a really important email from a Dean or a crying child. We model this outside competition for attention as further "distractions" to attention. Formally, suppose there are n 0 (exogenous) other messages (or activities) which compete for attention along with the advertising messages. Hence now we have N = XΘ θ=0 n θ . We associate an exogenous social value π 0 > 0 to outside each message (or activity) examined (the positive value reßects the fact that the individual allows herself to be distracted).
Message volume with distractions
With distractions, it is still true that each active sector's message share is
(see (6) ). However, to Þnd the total number of messages, N , now means adding in the outside sector, so the earlier CES form is amended to yield the implicit form:
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Writing this out, we have a quasi-CES form
The LHS is linear in N (with a positive intercept), and the RHS is convex (and starts at 0), so that there is one intersection with N > 0, which is thus the unique solution. The comparative static properties of the equilibrium are quite simple, and concur with previous results. One new one: a higher value of n 0 leads to a higher N , and n θ falls in all other sectors.
However, now there is a real effect of uniform cost changes. To see this, suppose that γ θ falls to γ θ (1 + s)
for all θ > 0 (with s < 0). Then (28) becomes
φ−1 , and clearly N rises when s falls. From the same equation, a higher N also entails a lower value of N (1 + s). This means that a lower cost per message now raises the number of messages less than proportionately. From (6), each active sector's share of the larger message total is bigger, as well as being larger in absolute terms. This is reßected too in the equilibrium price distribution: from (15) and the arguments of Proposition 9, noting that N/π 0 rises, the lower cost decreases prices (in the sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance).
Welfare analysis
We Þrst show that there is still the right allocation of N (cf. Proposition 13), but too many messages. The welfare function is now written as
where n 0 distractions vie for the attention span of φ given N total competitors. The proof follows the lines of the earlier one. For any given N , the partial derivative marginal beneÞt expressions (which are to be equalized across all sectors in the second-best problem of choosing the optimal allocation of N messages)
are the same as those given before, and hence the equilibrium still has the "right" allocation of the messages across sectors, but too many messages (given π 0 > 0).
We already showed a uniform cost increase reduces the number of messages, and has real effects which harm consumers since prices rise. Evaluating at τ = 0 yields again the result that the equilibrium entails, Hence welfare increases locally from a uniform percentage tax. Here, a tax has the additional social beneÞt of rendering more prominent the "distractions."
Conclusions
The Information Age is characterized by a surfeit of information sent at relatively low cost. Modern economies involve many media which can be used to catch the attention of prospective consumers, so the attention span of consumers is likely larger than ever before. Yet modern economies also involve many product classes.
These factors interact to determine information congestion and the consequent degree of competitiveness of sectors, as reßected in the degree of price dispersion. Below we bring together some of the key comparative static properties and how they are transmitted. the lower prices eventually come to dominate as it becomes less proÞtable to send messages as it is likely that other offers register with the consumer. This suggests that both more attention and more product classes raise the volume of information. Eventually though the attention span effect reduces information volume and increases competition. Thus, whether prices get lower depends crucially on whether attention rises "faster" than the range of (desirable) goods.
The model borrows heavily from Butters (1977) in using a zero-proÞt condition to derive equilibrium price distributions. But it differs in key respects in assumptions and conclusions. While Butters' model assumes that each message is read by some consumer, here some messages are "lost" because they are not read at all. We stress too the competition for attention across sectors, which gives rise to cross-sector effects in pricing and message volume. While Butters Þnds that the overall level of advertising is optimal, we have too much advertising, though a constrained optimality result is retained in the sense that the allocation across sectors is optimal, given the equilibrium message level.
The intuition for our optimal allocation of ads across sectors, given the total (excessive) volume, is as follows. First, the congestion externality of the overall ad level is the same regardless of which sector sends an extra ad (the term ∂W/∂N in the normative analysis). Second, the individual sector contribution to welfare from an extra ad is the probability it is seen, weighted by its social contribution, from which is subtracted the sending cost. As with the Butters model, this is the proÞt of the top Þrm, and so is zero for all sectors.
The model delivers a detailed picture of equilibrium price distributions across asymmetric sectors competing for attention. Equilibrium message ratios are shown to obey an inverse IIA property. The equilibrium total volume of advertising messages is a CES function of the individual sectors' proÞtability measures. This constitutes a novel derivation of such a CES function, and is instrumental in delivering sharp predictions.
A CES form is still central when we allow for "distractions" to the attention paid to ads. This device relaxes the homogeneity property that proportional decreases in communication costs raise ad levels proportionately, and gives rise to a modiÞed CES form for ad levels, whereby lower costs across the board now may cause weaker sectors to exit. However, a tax on ads still raises welfare despite the introduction of an "untaxed" sector (there is still over-advertising), and the allocation of ads across sector is still optimal under the constraint of the equilibrium total volume of messages.
Some caveats to the analysis constitute further extensions. The model is one of Þrms seeking (passive) consumers through ads, which can be thought of as the pure Couch Potato model. The converse case has consumers seeking opportunities through search. Indeed, both sides can be active, as in Baye and Morgan (2001) . One step in this direction is to allow the attention span to be endogenously determined by equating the expected surplus from an extra ad to the marginal cost of paying more attention: the current speciÞcation can be viewed as a simple version of this with prohibitive marginal cost at φ.
The model also views all media as equally delivering messages for attention, and is not immediately equipped to deal with which messages might be better suited to which media. Nor indeed is media pricing of message delivery given much shrift, though this is the topic of the (platform) economics of broadcasting.
Instead, perhaps like billboards, web-sites and bulk mail, access price is exogenous. The crucial marketing dimension of targeting of messages to consumers (for example through the use of speciÞc media) has been closed down through the device of a single representative consumer. Likewise, messages are assumed to be sampled randomly, so there is no allowance for the consumer to pay more attention to particular message types or Þlter out others. Information congestion and the Economics of Attention have yet to be fully ßeshed out in these broader directions. Butters (1977) supposes M consumers, and a single sending sector (so we can suppress the subscript θ in what follows). Letters are sent randomly, and each message reaches only a single consumer (ours potentially reach all consumers). Consumers examine all the messages received, and each buys at the lowest price received. As with our model, the equilibrium price support has no atoms, no holes, and runs up to b. It starts at c + γ, because a message at that price is surely read by whoever receives it, and it is a winner (in our model, it must start higher because even the best deal may be unread).
Appendix 8.1 A. Comparison to Butters model
We follow Butters in equating the probability of a sale from two different perspectives. The Þrst is the this equation suggests that an exponential form for the probability of Þnding an empty letterbox will give equivalence with the equilibrium. This remark underscores the formulation of Butters' letterbox technology.
To derive this, note that the probability that at least one of N letters sent reaches a particular one of the 
B. Proof of Proposition 13
Let N be given at the equilibrium level stipulated by (9) , that we denote as N e , and we wish to show that the division of these messages effectuated in equilibrium is optimal.
First, note that maximization of W (.) under the constraint that the non-negative n θ 's sum to a given value of N is a maximization problem of a continuous function on a compact set and therefore must have a solution. Therefore at least one of the n θ must be positive: call this sector j.
Second, substituting the constraint n j = N − XΘ θ6 =j n θ into W (n 1 , ., n j , ., nΘ; N ) enables us to write the maximand asW (n 1 , ., [n j ] , .., nΘ; N ), and we now show thatW (.) is concave in the arguments n 1 , ., [n j ] , .., nΘ 39 The interpretation is that the business stealing and consumer surplus appropriation externalities net out. Recall that the sum of concave functions is concave. The terms in the transmission costs γ are linear in n 1 , ., [n j ] , .., nΘ, while for θ 6 = j, the Q (n θ , N) terms are concave in own n θ . There remains the term
(by deÞnition (19) ): the summation term is linear in the n θ , given N ; hence raising this to a power φ > 1 gives a convex function, and one minus a convex function is concave, as desired.
Third, sinceW (.) is concave, and is maximized over a compact and convex set, it has a unique maximal value. Let a solution be denoted © n By (23) we have
By the zero proÞt condition for active Þrms (3), (b θ − c θ ) q θ P θ = γ θ if n θ > 0; but (b θ − c θ ) q θ P θ ≤ γ θ for inactive sectors (see (4) ). This means that the market allocation solves (30), and so induces the maximal W (.) and hence the maximal W (.) under the constraint. In other words, as per (23), ∂W ∂n θ = 0 by the zero proÞt condition for the highest-priced sender in sector θ, and so the equalization condition is guaranteed at the equilibrium N e .
